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There are numerous accounts of Napoleon’s 1812 Russian campaign. One such is Leo Tolstoy’s novel War and Peace. Another is Adam Zamoyski’s historical study 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March on Moscow. Speaking loosely we call the former a work of fiction, the latter nonfiction. But is that a significant difference between them? After all, Tolstoy’s novel is full of historical facts and Zamoyski’s study full of colourful and moving description. 

Derek Matravers, in his eloquent, probing and philosophically provocative book, does not think the distinction between fiction and nonfiction is especially interesting. Or, more precisely, he does not think it points to anything very interesting about ‘what goes on in the mind of the reader’ (p. 2) when reading works of these kinds. Above all, he thinks that appealing to the imagination is simply not going to help in grasping any relevant differences. His principal target is what he calls the ‘consensus view’ among philosophers of fiction which holds that works of fiction invite imaginings while works of nonfiction (like historical narratives) invite belief. This view he deems to be ‘hopeless’ (p.3). 

Matravers’ project is ‘phenomenological’ (p. 129), with an emphasis on ‘what goes on in the mind’, and he admits to having ‘nothing to say about the semantic and ontological issues’ (p. 8) regarding different kinds of narrative. This dramatically delimits the enquiry in which he is engaged and goes some way, perhaps, towards taking the sting from his seemingly cavalier scepticism about the fiction / nonfiction divide. He doesn’t in fact reject that distinction but thinks that phenomenologically at least, it gains little purchase. However, setting aside semantics and ontology when talking about fiction might seem a bit like setting aside language when talking about poetry. But his project certainly should not be lightly dismissed. He offers insights and arguments that threaten the very foundations of much current philosophising about fiction. 

For Matravers, of more importance than the distinction between fiction and nonfiction is the distinction between ‘confrontations’ and ‘representations’, that is, ‘between things happening in our immediate environment’ (confrontations) and ‘things being represented to us as happening at other times or in other places’ (representations) (p. 3). ‘This coincides roughly,’ he says, ‘with the distinction between situations that afford the possibility of action and those that do not’ (p.3). It is one thing to be present in Moscow when Napoleon’s troops march in, causing you to run away or to cheer, quite another to ponder a representation of this event, where running or cheering seem curiously pointless.  Representations describe not just what is ‘happening at some other time or some other place’, but also ‘events that might happen, could have happened, or will never happen’ (p.3). 

Needless to say, given his project, it is representations rather than confrontations that most occupy Matravers. There is a continuum, he thinks, from very ‘thin’ representations that merely describe situations to ‘thick’ representations—like novels or lively histories—that stimulate the imagination (p. 46, 57). But, to hammer home his central theme, ‘[t]he traditional distinction, between representations that are fiction and representations that are non-fiction, is entirely unhelpful’ (p.47). The primary reason is that the way that we ‘process’ representations, what goes on in our heads, is neutral between fiction and nonfiction. 

Nevertheless, the ‘traditional distinction’ continues to haunt the discussion. Take the thought that only in confrontations, not representations, is action possible. But with representations there seem to be fundamentally different kinds of impossibility of action. Suppose I read about suffering in a newspaper and about suffering in a novel. It might be impossible practically for me to alleviate the suffering described in the news but it is impossible in principle for me to alleviate the suffering in Dotheboys Hall (Matravers’ example, p. 50). Isn’t that fiction / nonfiction coming round again? Matravers responds like this:

All this shows is that it might be unclear at the outset whether a representation relation could be turned into a confrontation relation. Representation relations which cannot will include all fictional representations and also all non-fictional representations where we lack instrumental beliefs that would enable us to act: that is, all non-fictional representations that are out of our grasp because they are separated in time, or space, or both. (p. 50)

That response is not wholly compelling. It is certainly impossible for me to confront (in the sense of allowing me to act on) the suffering in the Black Death. Is that the same kind of impossibility as the impossibility of my saving the children at Dotheboys Hall? Maybe it is or maybe the question is ‘entirely unhelpful’. But distinguishing a representation of a real event and a representation of an imaginary event still seems important and cannot quite to brushed aside with questions about whether or not we can take action to do something about it. Arguably, contra Matravers, the distinction between what is real and what is made up goes deeper than the distinction between what we can and cannot act on. 

This becomes evident with representations that come close to confrontations. What could be more of a stimulus to action than someone shouting ‘Look out! There’s a bear behind you!’?  Yet the hearer is confronting not a bear but a representation (an uttered sentence). Crucially, any action is going to depend on how the utterance is taken, for example as a genuine warning, or part of a game. The sentence itself doesn’t tell us whether we should take it seriously. Yet there is no ‘neutral’ response here between fiction and nonfiction, no common phenomenology in the two options. On the contrary, how the representation is taken might lead to either terror or amusement. Indeed even in confrontations reality and make-believe demand stark choices. Do we run away? Only if we think it is a real bear and not a prankster in a bear suit.

If downplaying the fiction / nonfiction distinction is one of Matravers’s aims, another related aim is to break the link between fiction and the imagination. Here he does take on something like a consensus view among philosophers (his principal target is Gregory Currie), namely a view that associates ‘fictional worlds’ with ‘imaginary worlds’ and the thought that novels standardly offer pictures to the imagination not literal truths to be believed (one might also suppose that this is a commonsense view). Of course working out these commonplaces turns out to be notoriously tricky. And Matravers is very effective at picking away at them. He is right, clearly, to remind us that historical works like Zamoyski’s stir the imagination no less than novels like Tolstoy’s, and that there is plenty in novels—not just historical novels—that readers are invited to believe as literal truth, including facts about the real world in which novels are set. He is right too that philosophers of fiction get into all sorts of tangles about how to explain those sentences in novels that appear to make straightforward claims to truth. But does it help to sideline imagination altogether in understanding fiction? I suspect not and it might seem so to Matravers only because of his insistence on stressing the similarities between representations, be they fictional or nonfictional. 

What is the basis of that insistence? It comes back to the focus on what ‘goes on in the mind of readers’. It is here, I suggest, that Matravers’ account is at its most vulnerable. Significantly he appeals to empirical studies of ‘text processing’ by psychologists. These invoke ‘mental models’, ‘information sources’, ‘memory stores’, and ‘general schemata’. Matravers’ attitude to this empirical work is curiously ambivalent. He approves it because it supports his wider thesis that what goes on in the mind when readers engage with narratives is indifferent to whether the narratives are fiction or nonfiction and he is pleased to report, in a footnote, that ‘nowhere, in the thousands of pages of the psychology of text processing I have read … is there mention of “the imagination”’ (p.55). But he also recognizes the shortcomings of this work: the use of artificially simple examples and the ignoring of such distinctions as between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ representations or between ‘discourse’ and ‘story’ (pp. 64-65). He might have mentioned, crucially, the insufficiently analysed notion of a ‘reader’. 

In general Matravers should have been more sceptical of the philosophical significance of this work and more cautious in the support he draws from it. If he had attended less to the work of empirical psychologists more to that of experienced literary critics writing about novels and if he had compared this to experienced historians appraising the work of fellow historians, he would have got a quite different picture of the terrain. He would have seen, for example, how quickly the psychological processes of reading common to all kinds of narrative—at the basic ‘what goes on in the mind’ level—are in effect taken for granted and then set aside. The radical differences between literary critics and historians, in terms of modes of reading, occur at a different level: at the level of normative practices, where these practices determine, for example, what questions are asked, where attention is directed, and how judgments are made. Here the reading processes, even if described as ‘what goes on in the mind’, rapidly diverge. For one thing the fiction / nonfiction distinction becomes more salient. ‘Inventing character’, admired in the novel, is not acceptable in sound history. No historian would get away with War and Peace. Nor should we suppose that the procedures of professional critics and historians are somehow esoteric and not reflective of the concerns of ‘the common reader’. The underlying principles of what it is to read fiction (or nonfiction) are utterly familiar. 

Also, the connection of fiction and imagination re-emerges. Good readers of the novel employ their imagination not just in imagining the propositions expressed but in making connections, pursuing themes, identifying symbolic or figurative meaning. Good historians might praise writing that stirs their imagination but they will also press the soundness of sources, the persuasiveness of inferences, and the comprehensiveness of explanations. Differences in reading practices are palpable and these should inform philosophical discussions of fiction. 

It looks, then, as if Matravers’ ‘phenomenological project’ is too limited in scope with its focus on a narrow conception of ‘what goes on in the mind of the reader’. But much philosophical discussion of fiction is itself narrow, often not interested in pursuing, for example, why a distinction between fiction and nonfiction might be important or how modes of reading might differ.  One thing is certain, though: philosophising about fiction will take a huge jolt from Matravers’ book. It challenges some fundamental assumptions and is rich in careful probing argument. No-one in the field can afford to ignore it. It is original, hard-hitting and will awaken many of us from our dogmatic slumber. Also there is much more in it than I have been able to raise: perennial favourites like the ‘paradox of fiction’ (said to be neither a paradox nor about fiction), the role of narrators, ‘imaginative resistance’ (the title rejected) and also a most illuminating, and far from unsympathetic, analysis of the work of Kendall Walton, the founding father of this whole game. 
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